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IN DEFENCE OF BYRHTNOTH 
I. J. Kirby 
This paper has one occasion, one cause, and one objective. The occasion is 
the recently-commemorated millennium of the battle of Maldon, an appro-
priate time to review not only the events of August 991 but also the critical 
responses to them, including those of the millennial year. The cause is the 
all-too-prevalent scholarly opinion, expressed as often in the last decade as in 
previous ones, that Byrhtnoth cannot escape censure for the English defeat, 
whether that censure be gentle or virulent. M y objective is to demonstrate 
that this opinion is mistaken. 
A close examination of the articles written by Warren Samouce in 1963, 
Duncan Macrae-Gibson in 1970, and George Clark in 1979 might leave the 
reader with the impression that Byrhtnoth's honour needs little, if any, 
further defence. Not so. In 1982, Heather Stuart published a blistering 
attack on him and his followers: others have made milder but nonetheless 
critical comments on his decisions and actions, notably the granting to the 
Vikings of free passage across the brycg, which also seem to indicate that 
they have ignored, or rejected, the arguments of his earlier defenders. The 
relative frequency of such attacks makes it abundantly clear that for some 
literary scholars Byrhtnoth's reputation at the beginning of 1991 was still 
shaky.1 
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The millennial year began well with the appearance of Donald Scragg's 
imposing and impressive commemorative volume. By happy accident, or 
design, the articles it. contains are refreshingly free of the anti-Byrhtnoth 
polemic of the eighties. In fact, only one article, that by Richard Abels, 
Associate Professor of History at the United States Naval Academy, is di-
rectly relevant to the present subject. Following Captain Warren Samouce's 
analysis of Byrhtnoth's options, it emphasizes the appropriateness of his 
strategy and the courageous example he gave his followers on the battle-
field. Similarly positive approaches to Byrhtnoth are found in Katherine 
O'Brien O'Keeffe, and in Hans Erik Andersen's publication The Battle of 
Maldon, which came out at the end of 1991. 
On the other hand, Richard North, in his article in Medium JEvum, is 
somewhat more hesitant: in his view, Byrhtnoth should have resisted the 
challenge to single combat which led to his death and, indirectly, to the 
English defeat. 
Finally: in no fewer than three lectures, given variously at the ISAS 
conference at Stony Brook and at the millennium conference at the Uni-
versity of Essex, reference was made by three eminent Anglo-Saxonists to 
the Charge of the Light Brigade at the Battle of Balaclava (the result, 
as Tennyson has it, of a strategic blunder); and one of the three made it 
abundantly clear that he shared the feelings of earlier critics of Byrhtnoth's 
decisions and actions in August 991. 
? It seems, then, that the battle for Byrhtnoth's honour is not yet won, 
and that further consideration may properly be given to a literary dispute 
which, in the words of Richard Abels, "at times has been as hotly contested 
as the battle itself" (148). 
M y argument will be based on three premises. The first of these is that 
the unknown poet of The Battle of Maldon has given an account of the 
events which in its broad outline, though not necessarily in detail, reflects 
what actually happened. M y own position on this issue is that of many, 
though certainly not all, scholars: the broad historicity of the poem has not 
been successfully attacked, the attempts made in recent years have been 
attacked in their turn, while such scholars as Margaret Locherbie-Cameron 
continue to publish solidly-based investigations which reinforce the view 
that the poet wrote soon after the battle and was well informed about it. 
The second of my premises is that the battle took place where Laborde 
claimed it did, a point more generally accepted even though there is still no 
archeological evidence to substantiate his view (nor, sadly, is there likely to 
be in the foreseeable future, to judge from the pessimistic views expressed 
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by Essex archeologists who attended the millennial conference). M y third 
premise is more controversial, and will need a modicum of comment, for it 
relates to the notorious adverbial phrase "/or his ofermode" (Maldon 89). 
Since Helmut Gneuss's 1976 paper on the implications of this phrase, 
it has been generally agreed (though one or two scholars, including, most 
recently, Andersen, have argued against it) that in the poem "ofermod" 
has a negative connotation. There is a good deal of evidence in favour of 
a negative sense in Old English in general, and very little against, and my 
own admittedly cursory examination of the materials available in the Dic-
tionary of Old English project in Toronto does not lead me to challenge 
Gneuss's arguments and conclusions. However, there is (as Gneuss himself 
indicated) a very considerable difference between the possible extremes of 
interpretation of the phrase in a negative sense: it is one thing to read 
it as "Then Byrhtnoth, in his over-confidence, allowed too much land to 
the hateful people," quite another to interpret it as "Then Byrhtnoth, in 
his overweening pride, allowed too much land to the hateful people." In 
my view, if the phrase be critical, it should be read in the former sense — 
a Hardyesque foreshadowing of tragedy, not a monkish fulmination against 
worldly pride. However, even if there is a modicum of criticism in the poet's 
comments, it is not necessary to accept that it is any more than the first 
known example of "wisdom after the event" in connection with Byrhtnoth's 
decision. Why should the Maldon poet, criticized as he sometimes is for his 
facts, be uncritically allowed the last word in his expression of his opinion 
on a question of military tactics? M y final premise, then, is that Byrhtnoth 
should not be judged on the basis of hindsight, but on what can be deter-
mined of his objectives and his strategy in opting for pitched battle against 
the Vikings. 
Byrhtnoth's principal objective in the military operation, as judged by 
his actions and the words attributed to him, was not to liberate Northey, or 
to keep the Vikings bottled up on it (which would serve no useful purpose, 
since, as Samouce and others have said, they could make their way back 
down the Blackwater to the open sea unopposed whenever they liked). Nor 
was it to defend the town of Maldon, for in that case he would have remained 
there. Rather, it was to defend England and its people as a whole against 
an enemy which specialized in sudden attacks on places where booty was 
likely to be obtained, and was in consequence not easy to bring to bay. This 
objective would not be served by purely defensive action: the mere repulse 
of the Vikings at the Northey causeway, or at Maldon itself, would be only 
an empty victory, resulting inevitably in attacks elsewhere — if we can trust 
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the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, it was this particular Viking force that had 
already attacked Ipswich, and probably Folkestone and Sandwich as well. 
Only by bringing the Vikings to battle in a situation advantageous for the 
English could Byrhtnoth hope to achieve his principal objective. 
This, in my view, explains his strategy. The Vikings, who are no doubt 
encamped on the firm, slightly rising ground just back from the Northey 
end of the causeway, have already taken up a position ideal for defence 
but well suited as a base for an attack on Maldon if this should prove 
appropriate. Byrhtnoth, in turn, takes an initial position which is also well 
suited for defence in that it eliminates the Vikings' advantage in mounting 
an attack on Maldon. On the other hand, it is useless for an offensive 
action: had the men of Essex attempted to force the causeway, their fate 
would unquestionably have been comparable to that of the Vikings in the 
first part of the battle. We thus have the paradoxical situation that both 
sides need an offensive action to achieve their objectives (once protection 
money has been refused by Byrhtnoth), but hold positions appropriate to 
defence rather than attack. 
Byrhtnoth's first achievement, then, is to be on the defending side in 
the first part of the action; it is the Vikings, not he, who demonstrate 
their over-confidence in the causeway episode. If his reply to the Viking 
messenger as recorded in the poem reflects what he said, he can be credited 
with having manoeuvred the Vikings into the position of attackers by his 
reference to the defensive role he was appearing to adopt; but in any case 
the result was the same, and prudent generalship has its just reward — the 
enemy is repulsed. Unfortunately for the men of Essex, however, common 
sense returns too quickly to the Vikings: realizing that they cannot force 
the causeway, or only with unacceptably heavy loss, they revert to strategy. 
And Byrhtnoth makes his fateful decision. 
In order to understand the strategic reasons for Byrhtnoth's decision, 
we must begin by recognizing that, once the Vikings had stopped trying to 
force a passage across Southey Creek, the defensive advantage of the En-
glish position disappeared. As I have already argued, it was not Byrhtnoth's 
principal objective to keep the Vikings from the south bank of the Black-
water; in consequence, a refusal on his part to let them cross the causeway 
would merely have condemned other parts of the coast to what Ipswich had 
already suffered. Contrary to what is still being stated by some critics, 
Byrhtnoth (as most recently indicated by Richard Abels in the millennial 
volume) did not give up a strong defensive position, but rather a strong 
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defensive position that had served its purpose and was now no more than a 
deterrent. And a stand-off was not what England needed. 
It follows, then, that if a negative answer to the Vikings' request would 
have served no ultimately useful purpose, it could only be justified if an 
English victory could be judged to be against the odds. In determining 
this issue, Byrhtnoth would have had to take two principal factors into 
consideration: the relative size of the opposing forces, and any strategic 
advantage which might accrue to him as a result of a positive answer. 
From the information we have about the battle, it seems impossible to 
calculate with any precision the size of the English army: George Clark's 
estimate, for example, ranges from some 550 to 2,500 or more. As regards 
the Vikings, the figure of 93 ships given in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle is 
considered unreliable by many critics; but Helmut Gneuss ventured the 
opinion that the Viking force may not have been much smaller than the 
2,000 to 2,500 these ships could have held. However, I think due weight 
should be given to Clark's arguments on this point, that since the Viking 
fleets mentioned in Norse texts, including those relating to Olaf Tryggvason, 
are on the whole considerably smaller, the one that sailed up the Blackwater 
is likely to have been so also. But this is, in the final analysis, guesswork: 
the essential point, it seems to me, is that Byrhtnoth, who is likely to have 
obtained a rough estimate of the force opposing him from observers along 
the route of the Viking approach, confirmed perhaps by his view across the 
mud flats of the ships beached on Northey, and the Vikings, who could 
see from the firm ground on Northey just above the causeway what sort of 
force was marching to oppose them, both considered that victory was on 
the cards, and acted accordingly. 
What, then, of the strategic significance of the English withdrawal? We 
have seen that Byrhtnoth's position alongside the Blackwater lost its defen-
sive advantage as soon as the Vikings gave up trying to force the causeway; 
falling back gave no corresponding advantage to the English force since 
there was at the time no artificial river bank and the land was (and is) 
more or less flat for a considerable distance back from the river. 2 For the 
English themselves, then, withdrawal was neither advantageous nor disad-
vantageous. But what of the Vikings? It cannot be sufficiently emphasized 
that by crossing the causeway they gave up the security against attack that 
Northey offered, they cut themselves off from their ships, and they took up 
a position from which there could be no easy means of retreat if the bat-
tle were to fail to go their way — the causeway would not easily have been 
re-crossed, as Macrae-Gibson pointed out, while George and Susan Petty, 
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in preparing their description of the site of the battle as it was a thou-
sand years ago, demonstrated particularly well the present-day difficulties 
of making one's way through the mud and the water. While the English, 
in the last resort, still had the option of fight or flight, as events proved, 
the Vikings lost the second option by their action: it was again they, not 
the English, whose action can rightly be described as over-confident. It is, 
I think, reasonable to assume that Byrhtnoth did not march his army back 
several furlongs, but only just so much of a distance as would permit the 
Vikings to cross without fear of being attacked as they did so. In conse-
quence, when battle was joined the Vikings had their backs to the river; 
there was now, therefore, no likelihood of their getting away safely in any 
numbers, and Byrhtnoth had given himself and his army the best chance of 
eliminating this particular threat to their fellowcountrymen, as was patently 
their principal duty. 
In his article in the millennial volume, Richard Abels cites the battle of 
Wednesfield (fought in 909 or 910) as an example of comparable tactics on 
the part of a Mercian and West Saxon force which in this case led to a quick 
victory against a Viking war band. But there is a closer, though fictitious, 
parallel to this situation in a work written some two centuries after Mal -
don, La3amon's Brut. A t lines 10,012-67 we have an account of the battle 
at the river Duglas, the details of which seem to be original to Lajamon 
(neither Geoffrey of Monmouth nor Robert Wace of Jersey have more than 
a brief and unelaborated account of the battle). According to La3amon, 
the Christian Britons under King Arthur, defending their homeland against 
the heathen Saxon invaders led by Colgrim (a decidedly Viking name at 
that!), meet their enemies at a ford over the river, where the first part of 
the battle takes place. This is indecisive: and after consideration Arthur 
decides to pull his army back to what Lagamon describes as a broad plain 
(10023). The Saxons interpret this as cowardice3 on Arthur's part; scenting 
victory, they rush across the river. But as soon as they are across Arthur, 
having addressed his men appropriately, leads them in a fierce attack, gets 
the better of his enemies, encircles them so as to block their retreat by the 
ford (10059), cuts down large numbers of them on land, and watches more 
than seven thousand others drown in the river — one of the few to escape is 
the Saxon leader Colgrim, whose horse, the only one mentioned, bears him 
safely back across the river (10056-57). 
This account of Arthur's legendary victory at the river Duglas 4 is, I 
believe, the key to what Byrhtnoth hoped for at Maldon. His first decision, 
to defend the causeway as long as the Vikings were prepared to try to force 
I. J . K I R B Y 59 
it, was correct in strategic terms and had the hoped-for success. His second 
decision, to abandon a defensive position whose usefulness had ended, and 
by withdrawing to put his enemies into a position from which they could not 
readily escape, while maintaining this latter option for his own forces, was 
also prudent and strategically justifiable. Yet while Lajamon invites us to 
admire Arthur for his tactics, some present-day scholars, following what they 
consider to be the example of the unknown poet of The Battle of Maldon, 
continue to criticize Byrhtnoth for adopting essentially the same strategy — 
a strategy, moreover, which has been commended by military experts who 
have written about it. Why this armchair criticism? Because Arthur won 
and Byrhtnoth lost? This, obviously, will not do; anyone can be clever 
with the benefit of hindsight. It is, I suggest, far more appropriate that 
as we look back on the millennial year we acclaim Byrhtnoth for following 
the right policy throughout, and place the blame for the ultimate failure 
where it properly belongs: with Godric and his minions. For his part, 
Byrhtnoth made the right decisions and, leading from the front, gave a 
splendid example to the men under his command. The defeat of the English 
at Maldon came about in spite of, not because of, his leadership. 
University of Lausanne 
NOTES 
1 It was to meet their reservations that an earlier version of the present paper was 
delivered at the ESSE conference at Norwich in September 1991. 
2 The idea suggested by Macrae-Gibson, and taken up by others, that the Vikings 
would have had to attack uphill is thus invalid, except in the most technical of senses. 
^ The word La3amon uses, arh.de (10026), is the very word used at Maldon, line 6. 
^ By an odd coincidence, the name Duglas apparently means "black (or dark) 
stream," see Roland Blenner-Hassett (33). In Maldon, of course, the name Panta is 
used: the river today is still called the Pant in its higher reaches. 
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